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MARSHALLING MCCULLOCH
Richard Primus*
David Schwartz’s terrific new book is subtitled John Marshall and the 200-Year Odyssey of McCulloch v. Maryland. But
the book is about much more than Marshall and McCulloch. It’s
about the long struggle over the scope of national power. Marshall and McCulloch are characters in the story, but the story isn’t
centrally about them. Indeed, an important part of Schwartz’s
narrative is that McCulloch has mattered relatively little in that
struggle, except as a protean symbol.
Schwartz sees the Constitution, properly understood, as warranting a robust vision of national power. The book’s studied ambivalence about the canonical status of McCulloch is partly a
function of McCulloch’s capacity to retard as well as to advance
national power, and thus to vindicate or repress the spirit of the
Constitution, depending on who is using it. In Schwartz’s view,
McCulloch should be pressed into better service for its capacity
to vindicate the best view of national power. But better yet would
be for that view to be vindicated in a way that did not rely on the
backward-looking, court-centered, Marshall-celebrating framework that is inextricably part of marching under the banner of
McCulloch. 1
The appearance of the book is an important moment in the
development of a new wave of literature arguing for expansive
conceptions of national power and, in particular, for skepticism
toward the orthodox account of Congress as a legislature limited
by enumerated powers. Schwartz’s fellow travelers in that
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1. See, e.g., DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 254 (2019).
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literature include John Mikhail,2 Robert Reinstein,3 and, well,
me.4 This literature is not skeptical about federalism, and it
doesn’t think that the national government should be able to act
without limits.5 But it doubts that the Constitution’s enumeration
of congressional powers can or should do the limiting work that
orthodox constitutional-law discourse assigns to it.6 One of the
targets of Schwartz’s book is accordingly the familiar idea that
even without respect to affirmative limits like those articulated in
the First Amendment, there are things that Congress lacks the authority to do, because its enumerated powers are collectively less
than a grant of general jurisdiction. In a delightful coinage,
Schwartz calls this idea “the mustbesomething rule,”7 because it
holds that there must be something that Congress cannot do, even
before we start talking about affirmative prohibitions. (I have
previously called this idea the “internal limits canon,”8 a term
with a decent rationale but none of the pizazz of Schwartz’s label,
so I may be switching.)
Schwartz thinks the mustbesomething rule is ill-conceived,
and he thinks McCulloch provides a framework for understanding
why. But he is not arguing that Marshall deliberately wrote an
opinion that would authorize plenary federal power, nor anything
close to it. Instead, the book presents Marshall in McCulloch as
having practiced “defensive nationalism,”9 aimed more at resisting radical states’-rights views than at establishing a strong view
of national power. Seen in historical context, Schwartz writes,
Marshall’s opinion is cautious on all of the truly explosive national-power issues of the day, notably slavery and internal

2. See, e.g., John Mikhail, Is the Constitution a Power of Attorney or a Corporate
Charter? A Commentary on “A Great Power of Attorney”: Understanding the Fiduciary Constitution by Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 407 (2019); John
Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045 (2014).
3. See Robert J. Reinstein, The Aggregate and Implied Powers of the United States, 69
AM. U. L. REV. 3 (2019).
4. See Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576 (2014).
5. See, e.g., id. at 595-96.
6. See, e.g., id. at 596-98.
7. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 242.
8. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 4, at 578 (emphasis added).
9. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 5. Schwartz credits Charles Hobson with the term. Id.
at 17.
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improvements.10 Much of the real action in nineteenth-century
doctrines about federal power, in Schwartz’s view, was animated
(and distorted) by judicial attempts to prevent Congress from being able to jeopardize chattel slavery in the states where it was
practiced. Not until after Emancipation (in particular, in the Legal
Tender Cases11) was McCulloch presented as authority for a significantly more robust nationalist vision,12 and Schwartz describes Justice Strong’s use of McCulloch in the Legal Tender
Cases as an exercise in entrepreneurial misreading, one that made
more of McCulloch than McCulloch made of itself.13 But the
post-Civil War Court did not want to embrace McCulloch’s nationalism fully, because that would have opened the door to expansive exercises of congressional power under the Reconstruction Amendments, which the Court was determined to avoid.14
(Again, the specter haunting the construction of congressional
power is the need to insulate racial hierarchy against potential reform; Schwartz’s thoroughly critical diagnosis of the Court here
reads like cold water dumped on Larry Lessig’s recent rehabilitative account in Fidelity and Constraint.15) Only in the 1940s did
Chief Justice Stone resuscitate the nationalist use of McCulloch,
with assists from historians Thomas Reed Powell and Charles
Beard.16 And this time, the Court was about to embrace congressional efforts to combat racial discrimination, so the powerful
force that blocked that possibility earlier in history was finally
turned in the other direction, and the nationalist reading of
McCulloch could have staying power.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See, id. at 52-53, 58.
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 143-44.
Id. at 148-49.
Id. at 155.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY AND CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS
READ THE CONSTITUTION 284-334 (2019) (presenting an account of Supreme Court jurisprudence during and after Reconstruction on which the Court was not animated by an impulse to preserve racial hierarchy). Lessig’s account is partly indebted to the work of Pamela
Brandwein. See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
RECONSTRUCTION (2011); Lessig, supra, at 284 (crediting Brandwein).
16. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 201-02.
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Schwartz is not the first to see the modern, nationalist view
of McCulloch as a creature of the mid-twentieth century.17 But
what follows in Schwartz’s telling is an argument that even after
the New Deal, judicial doctrine has subordinated the robust national-power view that McCulloch might represent to a more restrictive view associated with a different Marshall decision: Gibbons v. Ogden.18 The key difference between the two
frameworks, Schwartz explains, is the difference between associating Congress’s broad, post-New Deal legislative jurisdiction
with the Necessary and Proper Clause (per McCulloch) and associating it with the commerce power as such (per Gibbons).19
Schwartz reads the modern Court from Wickard v. Filburn20 to
Gonzales v. Raich21 as favoring the Gibbons paradigm.22 And
that choice had bite, Schwartz says, in the greatest twenty-first
century mustbesomething case: NFIB v. Sebelius.23 Chief Justice
Roberts’s argument that a law creating (rather than regulating)
commerce cannot be justified as necessary and proper for the execution of an exercise of the commerce power makes sense,
Schwartz argues, only if the scope of congressional power under
the Necessary and Proper Clause is limited by the terms of whatever other power it is invoked to support—here, the commerce
power.24 And that sort of transferred limitation would make sense
on a Gibbons view, where the question is ultimately whether the
commerce power gives Congress the authority at issue. But on a
robust McCulloch view, Congress is entitled to do things that are
in no way regulations of commerce, so long as they are practically
helpful for other things that are regulations of commerce. Naturally enough, Schwartz prefers the necessary-and-proper framework, understood as the more expansive of the two because it
overtly authorizes Congress to regulate things that are not commerce.
17. For one earlier account, see Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to Congressional Power: Revisiting the Legal Tender Cases, 95 GEO. L.J. 119 (2006).
18. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
19. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 154-55 (drawing the distinction).
20. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
21. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
22. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 226-34, 242-43.
23. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
24. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 245.

2020

SCHOLARSHIP IN REVIEW

93

Schwartz’s careful teasing apart of the McCulloch and Gibbons strands of doctrine over time is one of the book’s excellent
contributions to the literature. The book makes a compelling case
that McCulloch’s doctrine has been the more expansive framework through most of history. But to the extent that the project
here is not just understanding the past but also setting up the future, it is worth wondering whether the relationship between the
two ways of thinking might shift, or might already have shifted.
In recent times, the Supreme Court opinion that most thoroughly
nails the analytic difference Schwartz is excavating here is Justice
Scalia’s concurrence in Raich, as Schwartz recognizes.25 Unlike
the Court majority, which regarded congressional authority to
prohibit the growing of medical marijuana as within the commerce power,26 Scalia located the relevant provision of law firmly
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.27 And at least as much
as any Justice, it was Scalia who understood the limiting potential
of deeming exercises of power to occur under the Necessary and
Proper Clause rather than under clauses with their own substantive content, because a non-deferential Court will make up its own
mind about whether a given action is “improper.” (Shutting down
medical marijuana was proper, but directing sheriffs to do background checks was not.28) So as long as the judiciary remains
willing in Commerce Clause cases to respect formal jurisdictional
hooks like the one in the reenacted Gun Free School Zones Act,29
federal legislation might find safer haven in substantively obtuse
formalisms deployed within the Gibbons paradigm than in the
world of normative judgment that awaits under the Necessary and
Proper Clause. And in the highest-stakes cases, one might be
skeptical that the choice of doctrinal framework will matter. Perhaps the decision will depend, as someone once said, “on a
25. See id. at 243.
26. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 5 (identifying the question presented as one about the scope
of the commerce power).
27. Id. at 34-35 (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24, 933 (1997); cf. Richard A. Primus & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Suspect Spheres, Not Enumerated Powers: A Guide for Leaving the Lamppost 15-17 (unpublished manuscript), [https://perma.cc/CR6G-AP5E] (explaining the use of the Necessary and Proper Clause as a vehicle for substantive, extra-textual
judgments limiting congressional power).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2015).
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judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise.”30
The largest potential impact of this book, then, does not flow
from its perspicacious reconstruction of this or that doctrinal
framework, whether in the modern jostling between Gibbons and
McCulloch or in its treatment of nineteenth-century struggles over
the scope of implied powers—though those would be enough to
make the book worth reading. It is rather a matter of the book’s
gestalt capacity to contribute to the potential reshaping (Schwartz
might say correcting) of the big-picture constitutional worldview
that law students absorb. If readers come away with the sense
that constitutional authorities (judicial and otherwise) have been
read in cramped ways in order to avoid letting Congress exercise
the full sweep of power that the Constitution warrants, they will
be moved incrementally toward Schwartz’s view of the spirit of
the Constitution.

30. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

